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Valuing Potential Groundwater Protection Benefits 
THOM^S D. CROCKER ^ND BRUCE A. FORSTER 
Department of Economics, University of Wyoming, Laramie 
JASON F. SHOGREN 
Department of Economics, Iowa State University, Ames 
This paper explores the implications of endogenous risk for the economic value of preventing 
groundwater contamination. We consider the analytical implications of endogenous risk for five key 
building blocks frequently used to structure studies of groundwater valuation: the probability and the 
location of contamination, the exposed population, risk perceptions, and intertemporal issues. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Groundwater is a valuable, renewable natural resource 
that, if contaminated by economic activities, may be ren- 
dered a nonrenewable, unusable, and mobile public hazard. 
Since groundwater contamination is inherently uncertain, 
efficient resource management requires information on how 
individuals react to risky events and their preferences for 
risk reduction. A mechanism to incorporate this information 
into policy decisions is cost-benefit analysis. Traditional 
cost-benefit analysis, however, invariably assumes that the 
individual's ability to influence risk is predetermined or 
nonexistent. Yet, exogenous risk is a restrictive assumption 
to apply to the behavior of someone who is confronted with 
groundwater contamination. Individuals often employ self- 
protecting activities to reduce the probability or severity of 
an asset loss. In other words, the individual's risks from 
groundwater contamination can be endogenous. 
For example, an individual can privately test for contam- 
ination or leaching. He may then drill a new well or employ 
private water treatment systems including activated carbon 
filters, reverse osmosis filters, and installation of systems 
which vent water to steam. Other private protection mech- 
anisms include use of aerator faucets, nonlead piping, proper 
disposal of household waste, purchasing bottled water, 
dumping bleach into a wall, or simply boiling water. These 
self-protection activities can remove bacteria, organics in- 
cluding fertilizers, solvents, pesticides, herbicides, and inor- 
ganics such as lead or cadmium. 
This paper explores the implications of endogenous risk 
for the economic value of preventing groundwater contami- 
nation. We consider the analytical implications of endoge- 
nous risk for five key building blocks frequently used to 
structure the groundwater valuation literature: the probabil- 
ity and the location of contamination, the exposed popula- 
tion, risk perceptions, and intertemporal issues. In general, 
we demonstrate that disregard of endogenous risk can cause 
the straightforward, piecemeal application of conventional 
cost-benefit analysis to underestimate the value of ground- 
water protection, potentially leading to a cumulative loss in 
groundwater resources. 
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Specifically, we argue that the current focus of groundwa- 
ter protection cost-benefit analysis is misdirected, since it 
fails to disentangle private and collective contributions to 
risk reduction. Private risk reduction efforts must be ac- 
counted for because differences in human capital among 
individuals induce differences in their self-protection pro- 
ductivities [Ehrlich and Becker, 1972]. Consequently, indi- 
viduals with identical preference orderings facing a uniform 
risk will value collective efforts to reduce risk differently 
according to their private marginal productivities at self- 
protecting. Therefore in order to establish the true value of 
preventing groundwater contamination one must consider 
the value of collective and of private reductions in risk. 
In terms of the aforementioned five analytical issues, 
endogenous risk implies that (1) the notion of the value of a 
statistical life may be misleading since it does not account for 
uniquely individual differences in the ability to influence an 
undesired event, (2) valuation exercises must consider not 
only specific locations but also lotteries over locations, 
because conditional uncertainty as to whether a specific site 
is at risk depends on the protective actions of private 
individuals, (3) the exposed population should not be multi- 
plied by a uniform probability of contamination to determine 
value, but rather each individual's unique probability that 
results from his self-protection behavior must be estimated, 
and only then can individuals' probability-weighted valua- 
tions appropriately be summed, (4) differences in "objec- 
tive" versus "subjective" risk perceptions may simply be 
due to the perceived private controllability of the risk, and, 
finally, (5) applications of uniform discount rates may be 
inappropriate because marginal rates of time preference will 
differ because of differences in protection or adaptation 
opportunities. The basic point is that an individual's valua- 
tion is dependent on his productivity at self-protection, and 
this must be considered prior to any attempt to establish the 
value of collective efforts to protect an environmental re- 
source such as groundwater. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 categorizes 
groundwater contamination episodes. Section 3 develops a 
proposed framework for ex ante analysis based on endoge- 
nous risk. The impact of endogenous risk on the five 
analytical issues is explored in section 4. Finally, section 5 
presents the concluding comments. 
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2. CATEGORIZ!NG GROUNDWATER CONTAMINATION 
PROSPECTS AND EPISODES 
Groundwater contamination episodes can be divided into 
three categories. Category 1 consists of known, currently 
existing contamination of a given site. The Love Canal fits 
this category. Category 2 represents prospective contamina- 
tion episodes (now unknown but occurring or which may 
occur in the future) from existing facilities. Every under- 
ground storage tank not now known to be leaking is in this 
category. Category 3 includes those proposed development 
sites which might introduce groundwater contaminants. This 
category includes an almost uncountable set of possibilities. 
The assessment echniques and requirements for each 
category differ considerably. In the first the economic issue 
is one of estimating the benefits and costs of alternative 
remedial actions in order to determine the appropriate 
responses to a known episode. The third category involves 
decisions about the appropriate degree of protection to be 
taken in designing and locating any future site. For the 
second category the issues revolve around risk attitudes and 
perceptions and comparisons of prospective costs and ben- 
efits of avoiding damage. 
3. A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR Ex ANTE ANALYSIS 
Given strong policy concerns about groundwater contam- 
ination, the economics literature that deals with it is surpris- 
ingly small. That literature which does exist deals almost 
exclusively with existing episodes (category 1) and the 
attendant human health risks. The studies ignore nonlife 
threatening health impacts and the anxiety cost of the 
possible consequences of an approaching plume or one that 
could change direction due to geological structure. They 
ignore the potentially large loss in wealth that households 
may experience if the threat of explosion from petroleum 
products requires evacuation of house and home. 
Most importantly, because they ignore endogenous risks, 
we believe that the analytical economic frameworks that 
have thus far been applied to studies of groundwater con- 
tamination are deficient in terms of their usefulness to the ex 
ante design of regulations (category 3) and to the estimation 
of the ex ante benefits of monitoring existing facilities 
(category 2). In general, the existing literature such as by 
Raucher [1983] and Edwards [1988] assumes that the eco- 
nomic agent is helpless when confronted by groundwater 
contamination risks. At best, he is only allowed to expend 
resources to remedy ex post damages; he supposedly pos- 
sesses no ability whatsoever to anticipate and to modify the 
potential size of these damages. 
Marshall [1976] shows that exogenous risk requires that 
an insurance (contingent claim) contract exist for every 
conceivable risk. Because the ex post compensation that the 
contingent claims supply can then maintain the ex ante 
utility level no matter what the realized state of nature, there 
are no differences between ex ante and ex post valuations of 
risk. However, because the writing and enforcement of 
contracts is costly, complete contracts rarely if ever exist: if 
he is averse to risk, the individual must therefore choose ex 
ante between contractually defining states of nature or 
making an effort to alter them. These endogenous, ex ante 
contractual and adjustment opportunities affect the individ- 
ual's relative valuations of alternative prospective states. 
Psychologists, for example, Perlmuter and Monty [1979] 
and Stallen [1984], concede that individuals perceive that 
contractual and adjustment opportunities allow them to 
exercise substantial control over uncertain events. Though 
one can always redefine a problem such that the state of 
nature is independent of human actions, the redefinition will 
frequently be economically irrelevant. Consider the proba- 
bility that bacterial groundwater contamination will poison a 
household' s drinking water. The probability of this event can 
be altered if the householder boils his water. One might 
redefine the state of the world to be independent of the 
owner's actions by thinking in terms of the probability of 
groundwater contamination. The owner may have no control 
over the probability of contamination. However, this prob- 
ability is not economically relevant. The owner is interested 
in the probability of being made ill, and he is able to exercise 
some control over that event. Risk is endogenous. 
Consider a risk-averse individual who must decide how 
much expenditure s on self-protection to undertake as he 
confronts the prospect of having some valuable personal 
asset such as his house or his health h exposed to ground- 
water contamination r. For a particular liability regime his 
dilemma arises because his prior self-protection expendi- 
tures which reduce the cumulative probability F(h; s, r) and 
the severity and hence the costs C(h; s, r) of any ex post 
damages will also cause his ex ante personal consumption to 
fall. Because of adverse selection, moral hazard, and non- 
independence of risks, the individual chooses not to or 
cannot acquire enough market insurance to avoid the di- 
lemma completely. Given his insurance purchases and given 
that his utility is intertemporally separable, we suggest hat a 
minimal formulation appropriate to most prospective 
groundwater contamination problems is 
Max U(M- C(h; s, r) - s, h) dF(h; s, r) (1) 
where U is avon Neumann-Morgenstern [1947] utility index 
defined over wealth, W = M - C( ) - s and health h. 
Expression (1) says that the individual's decision problem is 
to choose, given a full income M and hazard exposures r, 
that expenditure on self-protection s which maximizes his 
expected utility. His probability-weighted utility is a func- 
tion of his personal consumption and health state, where 
U•v > 0, Uh > 0, Uw•v < 0, and Uhh < 0. Subscripts refer 
to partial derivatives. At considerable cost in notational 
complexity, intertemporal and spatial features can, in prin- 
ciple, be introduced into (I) by appropriately defining h, s, 
and r in terms of time and locational distributions. 
The probability weights in (1) are represented by a sub- 
jective cumulative distribution function, F( ), defined over 
the minimum a and the maximum b health outcomes that the 
individual's genetics and developmental history allow. Pre- 
sume that the interval [a, b] is independent of self- 
protection. Let Fs < 0 and F r > 0 in the sense of first-degree 
stochastic dominance. Though the individual acting alone 
may be unable to influence the extent of pollution, he uses 
self-protection to reduce his exposure, thus influencing his 
cumulative distribution F( ) of health states. This probabil- 
ity distribution of health states is dependent upon self- 
supplied protection s from prospective exposures r. No 
restrictions need be placed on the signs of Fss, Frr, and Fsr 
in the immediate neighborhood of the expected utility 
maximizing level of self-protection s*. 
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For any health state that the individual might realize, he 
selects a minimum cost combination of ex post remedial 
expenditures and health damages. His ex ante efforts to 
protect himself rom exposures influence these ex post costs 
C such that Cs < O, Cr > 0, and Css > 0. The signs of Crr and 
Csr have no restrictions. The absence of signs for Fsr and Csr 
reflects the possibility that these responses depend upon the 
environmental concentration (quality) of contamination as 
well as the extent to which the individual chooses to self- 
protect [see Shibata and Winrich, 1983; Oates, 1983]. 
In order to maximize the expected utility index in (1) one 
must select a level of self-protection s* such that the 
first-order condition 
b EUw = -E[UwCs] + (UwCn - Un)Fs dh (2) 
is fulfilled. The second-order sufficiency condition is as- 
sumed to hold whenever (2) holds. The left-hand side of (2) 
represents the marginal cost of increased self-protection in 
terms of the utility of foregone wealth or consumption. The 
fight-hand-side reflects two types of marginal self-protection 
benefits: the first term is the severity effect, the direct utility 
effect of enhanced wealth resulting from reduced expected 
ex post costs; the second term is the probability effect, the 
indirect utility effect of a stochastically dominating change in 
the distribution of health outcomes. 
The indirect effect is derived by integrating by parts the 
effect of self-protection upon the F( ) distribution: 
(UwCn - Uh)Fs dh > 0 (3) 
since Fs(a; ) = Fs(b; ) = 0. To get a better understanding 
of the indirect effect, we can decompose the right-hand-side 
of (3) further by integrating by parts once more: 
U( ) dFs = (UwCh - Uh) F s dh 
Fs(k ) d ][UwChh--UwwCh--Uhh+2UwhCh] dh 
(4) 
The first term on the fight-hand-side of (4) is the mean effect, 
and the second term is the spread effect, both defined in 
terms of second-order stochastic dominance such that 
Fs dh < 0 Fs(k; ) dk < 0 (5) 
Expressions (3)-(5) imply that self-protection i directly in- 
fluences the health state lottery by shifting the mean value of 
h to the right and by reducing the variance associated with 
the distribution of health states. 
Shogren and Crocker [1991] show among other results 
that (1) and (2) imply that the marginal value of risk reduc- 
tions can be increasing and that self-protection expenditures 
need not be a lower bound to the value of risk reductions. 
These counterintuitive results can arise whenever there are 
differences in the marginal productivities of probability- 
reducing self-protection and of severity-reducing self- 
protection. Existing risk reduction valuation studies treat the 
decreasing marginal value of risk reductions and the lower 
bound nature of defensive expenditures as maintained hy- 
potheses [e.g., Smith and Desvousges, 1987; Bartik, 1988]. 
However, the results by Shogren and Crocker [1991] sug- 
gest that in the presence of incomplete contingent claims 
markets, traditional evaluations of the economic conse- 
quences of groundwater contamination and other forms of 
environmental risk have neglected plausibly large chunks of 
economic reality. This neglect combines a disregard of 
important private adjustment opportunities and a focus upon 
ex post states. There is some reason to believe that explicit 
consideration of these factors would have substantial impact 
upon measures of the economic consequences of groundwa- 
ter contamination. For example, Shogren [1990] and 
Shogren and Crocker [1990] empirically show that if both 
private and collective opportunities exist to reduce risk, a 
singular focus upon the collective can readily understate the 
total value of the risk reduction by a factor of two or more. 
In succeeding sections we present some specifics of why the 
analytical basis of the existing literature is excessively 
narrow when considered in terms of ex ante valuation given 
endogenous risk. 
4. ANALYTICAL ISSUES IN GROUNDWATER 
CONTAMINATION ASSESSMENT 
To illustrate the potential impact of endogenous risk on 
the cost-benefit analysis of groundwater contamination, we 
consider five key analytical issues' probability, 1ocational, 
population, perception, and temporal issues. 
Probability Issues 
The literature on the economics of potential groundwater 
contamination assumes that the probability of an undesired 
state of nature is exogenous to the individual. Raucher 
[1983] is the seminal contribution to the development of an 
analytical framework for analyzing groundwater contamina- 
tion episodes and the benefits of protecting groundwater 
integrity. He defines the expected net benefits at a particular 
site of a collective protection policy i, E(NBi) as the ex- 
pected benefits E(Bi) net of collective protection costs Xi. 
Thus 
E(NB i) = E(B i) - Xi (6) 
Expected benefits are defined as the expected damages E(D) 
avoided as a result of the policy. The expected damages are 
defined by 
E(D) = Pc[PdCr + (1 -- pd)Cu] (7) 
In (7), Pc is the probability that a contamination episode will 
occur at the site in the absence of collective policy i, and Pd 
is the conditional probability that contamination will be 
detected and human exposure prevented. Cr is the cost of 
the most economically efficient site-specific remedial re- 
sponse to the contamination episode, and Cu is the cost at 
the site imposed by continuing to use the contaminated 
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water. Since continued use is one plausible policy response, 
it follows that Cr -< Cu; that is, economically efficient 
remedial responses can be no more expensive than passively 
continuing to use the contaminated water. 
Cast in the fashion of (6) and (7), this framework portrays 
a binary collective policy choice. If policy i is collectively 
adopted, no contamination or human exposures will occur; if 
the collective policy is not adopted, human exposures will 
occur. Though Raucher [1986a, b] and Edwards [1988] 
broaden this binary treatment by allowing collective actions 
to induce continuous probability changes, they still have the 
probability of detection and the probability of exposure 
appear as exogenous to the individual to whom the benefits 
of contamination prevention will accrue. 
Main [1986] breaks the cost of detection down into the 
cost of cleanup with detection prior to exposure C)• and the 
cost of cleanup subsequent to exposure Cr 2. The cost of 
cleanup and human exposure isthus (Cr 2 + Cu). While this 
allows Main [1986] to capture the cleanup timing problem, 
he also treats the probabilities of C J, Cr 2, and (Cr 2+ C,,) as 
exogenous to the individual. 
Raucher [1983, !986a, b] and Main [1986] presume that 
benefit-cost analysis influences collective efforts to alter 
detection, contamination, and exposure probabilities. Be- 
cause they treat these probabilities as exogenous to the 
individual, they are able to base their benefit-cost analyses 
on the value of a statistical life, a measure of the cost of a 
single death weighted by a uniform probability of suffering it. 
However, even though each member of a set of individuals 
may be uniformly exposed to an environmental hazard, one 
cannot easily assume that each person faces the same 
probability of suffering from the undesired state. Individuals 
may have identical preferences. They may nevertheless have 
very different probabilities of realizing the undesired state 
because they differ in their abilities to self-protect from 
exposures to contaminated groundwater. Thus the uniform 
value of statistical ife or limb approach to benefits determi- 
nation that Raucher and Main suggest ignores the differences 
in individual risks induced by self-protection activities. 
Since these self-protection activities differ with individuals' 
capital stocks and access to contingent claims markets, 
complete valuation requires consideration ofthe individual's 
willingness-to-pay for collective and for private risk reduc- 
tions. Otherwise, the exclusive focus on collective action 
that Raucher and Main profess will undervalue the protec- 
tion of groundwater esources, leading to economically 
excessive levels of contamination. 
Locational Issues 
The Raucher [1983, 1986a, b] specification of C r as the 
site-specific, least-cost remedial measure can generate a bias 
toward sacrificing regional groundwater integrity. This 
piecemeal approach fails to recognize that for technical or 
economic reasons the least-cost remedial measure may be 
the collective or the private substitution of another egional 
groundwater source. The source might be moved to the 
individual; alternatively, the individual might move to it. The 
cost of resorting to this substitute will clearly depend upon 
its state of contamination. This mode of adaptation implies 
that neither the benefits of preventing contamination at a 
given regional site nor the costs of remedial actions at this 
site can be evaluated independently of the distribution of 
groundwater contamination throughout he entire region. 
Consequently, even site-specific valuation exercises must be 
constructed in terms of contamination lotteries defined over 
a set of locations rather than being limited to the specific site. 
In addition, the exercises must consider the individual's 
ability to influence these lotteries and the timing of their 
outcomes. For example, someone who dumps bleach into 
his well is not only reducing the contamination of his own 
groundwater supply, he is also enhancing the suitability of 
this supply as a potential substitute source of water for 
another contaminated site. Failure to account for these 
substitution possibilities will understate the value of ground- 
water protection. 
Population Issues 
Raucher [1983] does not refine the Cu measure. In his 
applications he takes Cu to be either realized crop yield loss 
from irrigating with contaminated water or realized health 
damage from drinking the contaminated water. 
Schechter [!985a, b] formalizes the health impact by 
assuming 
Cu = (Mr)(L)Pop (8) 
where Mr is the incremental health risk, L is the monetary 
value of life, and Pop is the size of the exposed population. 
The monetary value of life L is taken to be the representative 
individual's maximum willingness-to-pay for a small incre- 
ment in safety and is given by Sharerkin et al. [1984] as 
U(W) 
L = (9) (• - MF)U'(W) 
where W is the individual's wealth or discounted lifetime 
income, and U(W) is the individual's utility function. In this 
formulation, L is the value of a "statistical life" rather than 
one which is individual-specific. Expression (9) also pre- 
sumes that health is valued only insofar as it contributes to 
income, a presumption that individuals not in organized 
labor markets would question. 
The approach in (8) and (9) is also problematic because it 
treats the health risks imposed upon individuals as involun- 
tary. Again, since individuals self-protect according to dif- 
ferences in productivity, one cannot aggregate over all 
individuals while ignoring their private abilities to self- 
protect. The proper method to aggregate values is to account 
first for individual probabilities given private protection and 
only then to aggregate values across the exposed population. 
Perception Issues 
As Weinstein and Quinn [1983] argue, a central source of 
difficulty in measuring the economic consequences of risky 
events is the divergence between "objective" or "scientif- 
ic" measures of risk and the individual's perceptions of such 
risk. Objective damages are calculated as an objective 
probability of death (usually drawn from the best available 
natural science evidence) times a dollar value for safety 
(usually drawn from labor market studies). In contrast to 
such "damages", perceived damages for an individual are 
equal to his perceived (i.e., subjective) probability of death 
from the environmental risk at issue, times a perceived value 
of safety. The possible difference between these two mea- 
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sures of damages raises a fundamental policy problem, 
although Raucher [ 1986a, b] dismisses the subjective assess- 
ments as not relevant to the policy decision. Raucher's 
position is debatable for endogenous risk. The divergence 
between "objective" and "subjective" risk is often due to 
the individual's perception of controllability [Stallen, 1984]. 
This implies that self-protection opportunities influence sub- 
jective risk. In turn, this subjective risk determines the 
individual's chosen self-protection behaviors. It is these 
behaviors that determine his value of safety. Moreover, this 
further implies that the individual's objective probabilities of 
suffering harm are not independent of his subjective proba- 
bilities. 
Intertemporal Issues 
It is not just the current population but also future popu- 
lations which count in (8). Schechter [1985a, b] acknowl- 
edges intergenerational equity issues in groundwater con- 
tamination. Nevertheless, there are subtle intertemporal 
issues short of mutations appearing in future generations that 
need to be considered. 
Since groundwater can move slowly, the timing of a 
contamination episode may be separated by years or de- 
cades from the original spill if not detected early (recall the 
framework of Main [1986]). Housing developments may 
unknowingly be situated in the path of a contaminant plume 
that started from a leak in the past. A cost-benefit calculation 
that either ignored population projections or was based on 
faulty projections would underestimate the likely damages 
because the housing development was not foreseen and 
hence not included. 
In addition, the outcomes of programs to alter environ- 
mental resources are not immediately realized and then 
abandoned nor are the alterations necessarily permanent. 
Unless the individual is myopic, it follows that the instanta- 
neous expression in (1) must be modified to account for the 
temporal dimensions of his decision problem. In principle, 
this modification is not difficult: one simply redefines (1) as in 
the book by Hirshleifer [1970] to include time-state- 
dependent claims rather than just state-dependent claims. 
Even in the absence of complete contingent claims markets 
which allow the individual to arbitrage away any differences 
between his impatience and the after-tax market rate of 
interest, one might, as in the paper by Graham [1981], adjust 
the riskless rate to reflect this absence. In either case, 
custom first demands separate estimation of the relevant 
surplus (value) measure in each period and then application 
of the appropriate discounting formulae to the resulting 
stream of instantaneous consumer surpluses. The conclusion 
is an estimate of the present value of alternative time-state- 
dependent claims. 
However, while using logic similar to our model in (1)-(5), 
Blackorby et al. [1984] show that the custom is incorrect 
even when utility is intertemporally separable. By focusing 
solely on within-period effects, the customary procedure 
fails to account fully for the individual's opportunities to 
adapt to the effects of a risk-induced compensating income 
change in a particular period. In particular, it does not allow 
him to intertemporally redistribute his consumption and 
investment activities so as to equalize his marginal utility of 
income across periods. The individual's implied marginal 
rate of time preference (his discount rate) will obviously 
depend upon this intertemporal redistribution. Le Chatelier 
effects imply that the customary procedure will underesti- 
mate the present value of a time stream of environmental 
improvements and overestimate the present value of unde- 
sirable changes. 
Given that contingent claims markets are incomplete, that 
access to these markets differs among individuals, and that 
the individual's marginal rate of time preference is endoge- 
nous, the oft-debated question of the appropriate uniform 
discount rate across individuals becomes less significant. If 
consumer sovereignty commands respect, then discounting 
must be viewed as a personal decision based on the individ- 
ual's marginal productivity at self-protecting by intertempo- 
ral redistributions of his consumption and investment activ- 
ities. Given the endogenous risk phenomenon that this 
intertemporal redistribution implies, it also follows that 
individuals' valuations of protected groundwater should be 
aggregated only after accounting for each individual's pri- 
vate marginal rate of time preference. 
As noted by Rosen [1988], considerable research has 
examined intertemporal risk affecting life expectancy where 
risks are implicitly valued at various points in the life cycle. 
Rosen examines risk valuation over the life cycle where 
self-protection is assumed not to exist. This exogenous risk 
perspective is consistent with the previous literature but not 
with our argument of endogenous risk. Keen [ 1990] provides 
some empirical detail on the valuation consequences of 
disregarding intertemporal substitution possibilities. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The small number of existing studies on the value of 
inhibiting groundwater contamination may legitimately be 
viewed as precise. Precision does not guarantee that their 
value estimates are either accurate or complete. Current 
assessments typically ignore many dimensions of the eco- 
nomic consequences of groundwater contamination. In par- 
ticular, the existing literature fails to disentangle the collec- 
tive and the private provision of protection, insurance, and 
remediation. It thus produces unnecessarily restrictive pol- 
icy-relevant information about the relative importance of 
collective and private influences upon valuation. Inadequate 
model formulations may lead to inaccurate estimates of 
economic consequences. Further, the current assessments 
fail to include the full set of physical consequences associ- 
ated with groundwater contamination. This implies an un- 
dervaluation of contamination effects. Future research di- 
rected at refining and extending some of the model issues 
and formulations discussed here thus seems worthwhile. 
In conclusion, endogenous risk raises the issue of ex 
ante/ex post choice in the welfare economics of uncertainty. 
Standard welfare theory aggregates individual preferences to 
obtain a social welfare function. Under uncertainty, the 
social welfare function can be expressed in terms of the ex 
ante or the ex post state of the world. An ex ante choice 
implies that the welfare function is derived by maximizing 
individual expected utility (using individual perception of 
risk) and summing across individuals. The ex post choice 
derives a social welfare function by summing individual 
preferences under certainty, weighting them by the risk 
perceptions of experts, and then summing to obtain maxi- 
mum aggregate expected welfare. Hammond [1981] demon- 
strates that the ex ante and the ex post approaches will be 
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equivalent if and only if (1) all individuals have the regula- 
tor's perception of risk and (2) the social welfare function is 
a weighted sum of individual utilities under certainty. 
A social welfare function should respect individual pref- 
erences. However, Sandtoo [1983] points out that although 
preferences are usually assumed synonymous with "tastes," 
the regulator might not respect individual (mis)perceptions 
of risk. The regulator must decide whether to use individual 
perceptions (ex ante) or to use his own perception (ex post) 
derived from expert opinion. 
Suppose xperts conclude that a risk from a given envi- 
ronmental state is unacceptable but the public nevertheless 
chooses to use this environment. Does the regulator ban the 
environment or allow individuals to use their own discre- 
tion? The dilemma is to balance the tradeoff between pre- 
serving individual freedom of choice and maintaining public 
safety. The regulator may be tempted to regulate the risk in 
his view of the best interest of society. Such paternalistic 
action, however, conflicts with our society's commitment o 
consumer sovereignty, that is, the individual is best able to 
judge what is in his or her own self-interest. Even if there is 
no such conflict, any regulator inattention to individuals' 
abilities to employ discretion (endogenous risk) guarantees 
that his predictions of the economic consequences of his 
policies will differ from actual consequences. 
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